import usb.core
^ Professor Nicolas Cornell has recently argued to the contrary, although his competing account is offered as a first-order proposal in moral philosophy rather than an interpretation of tort law (or its moral commitments). Nicolas Cornell, Wrongs and Rights Come Apart 10 (2025). Cornell argues that someone who suffers loss through another person’s wrongdoing is for that reason alone morally entitled to obtain compensation from him, has special standing to demand an apology from him, and so on. Id. at 11, 16 (arguing that “many of our most significant injuries . . . arise out of matters over which we have no right,” id. at 11, and that such injuries can ground duties of “apology,” “compensation,” and “repair,” id. at 16). In my opinion, this view is implausible at least as to compensatory moral liability, both for the reasons described in the text above and because it dispenses with any sort of proximate cause–like restriction on the scope of a wrongdoer’s liability. Cornell’s view may be more plausible, however, with respect to other sorts of moral duties that arise out of wrongdoing, such as duties to apologize.。wps对此有专业解读
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